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Emma Cunliffe begins her account of the Kathleen Folbigg case, in Murder, Medicine 
and Motherhood,
 1
 with a quote from Patricia Williams: “That life is complicated is a 
fact of great analytical importance. Law often seeks to avoid this truth by making up 
its own breed of narrower, simpler, but hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths.”2 
Williams calls on us to recognise, and challenge, these ways in which Law occludes 
necessary complexity, and how closing down on complexity does damage to justice. 
Further, she argues, such challenges can reframe, rework—perhaps reclaim—law’s 
own narratives and rhetorical devices. So in my contribution to this conversation 
about law, women’s lives and justice, I want to highlight the ways in which Emma’s 
book takes up Williams’ call; offering a challenge and a reworking, and perhaps also 
a reclaiming of some of the criminal justice system’s most powerful rhetorical 
narratives. And at the same time, recognising, as Williams does, that sometimes there 
is utility in conventional categorisations, as long as one is attentive to the ‘rhetorical 
event’, and do not mistake such categories as representing an objective truth.  
 
In this review I address three aspects of the Folbigg case, as they are analysed in 
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, aspects that are, inevitably, related, complicated, 
and so defy neat packaging into sequential order. At the core of Emma’s book is her 
analysis of the gendered narratives of idealised, normative motherhood that were put 
to work so successfully both in the Crown case against Folbigg and in the media 
coverage of her case. So my starting point in this review was to consider the different 
levels at which these narratives registered—their significance in terms of the overall 
framing of Folbigg’s guilt, but also the ways in which the Crown’s striking, though 
not always consistent, appeal to these normative values underpinned the particularly 
troubling use of the rules of admissibility that allowed the court and the jury to 
consider in one trial, the multiple deaths of her children.
3
 In particular, the ways in 
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1
 Emma Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (Hart Publishing, 2011) 1.  
2
 Citing Patricia J Williams, “The Brass Ring and the Deep Blue Sea” in The Alchemy of Race and 
Rights (Harvard University Press, 1991). See also Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law 
(Routledge, 1989). 
3
 In New South Wales, the admission of this evidence was governed by the notionally exclusionary 
‘tendency’ and ‘coincidence’ rules found in ss 97, 98 and 101 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) forms part of Australia’s Uniform Evidence Law; Uniform Evidence Law 
jurisdictions in Australia comprise New South Wales, the Commonwealth and ACT, Victoria, NT and 
Norfolk Island. Sections of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), including s 98 were amended in 2009 by the 
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which the court accepted that facts that were, primarily, expressions of her role as 
primary carer were also probative of her guilt. But further, because of the heavy 
reliance on expert evidence in the case against Folbigg, and as has been made explicit 
in recent coverage of the case, there are other connections—in particular there are 
aspects of the emerging crisis in the forensic sciences that can be mapped onto this 
case.
4
 Presciently, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood offers ways for us to think 
                                                                                                                                                              
Evidence Amendment Act 2007 (NSW). At the time of Folbigg’s trial, s 98 required that the evidence 
have “significant probative value” before a fact finder could reason that “because of the improbability 
of the events occurring coincidentally, a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind.” In 
addition, s 101 prohibits the prosecution from relying on either tendency or coincidence evidence 
“unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have 
on the defendant.” At the time of Folbigg’s trial, s 101 was interpreted, in line with pre-existing 
common law authority, to require a determination by the trial judge that there be no rational 
explanation of the evidence consistent with innocence before the evidence could be admitted for the 
purpose of grounding either coincidence or tendency reasoning (the so called Pfennig test). In Folbigg, 
this was held to mean that the court should first assume that the other evidence left the jury with a 
reasonable doubt, and then consider whether the ‘coincidence’ evidence would eliminate that doubt, 
and that it would only be in such circumstances that it could be admitted for that purpose. Arguably, 
Hodgson J’s somewhat idiosyncratic articulation of the operation of the Pfennig test, in the string of 
related cases, WRC [2002] NSWCCA 210, Joiner [2002] NSWCCA 354 and Folbigg, for its circularity 
alone, does not represent a high point in terms of threshold management. Nonetheless, at least in 
theory, the evidence in Folbigg was subjected to one of the most stringent tests of admissibility both at 
the stage of deciding whether all of the cases could be heard together and in the trial itself. The 2009 
reforms, in combination with more recent jurisprudence have, arguably, lowered the thresholds 
embodied in ss 98 and 101, but not made the test(s) any easier to understand or apply; the case law in 
this area remains highly unstable. Historically, tendency and coincidence evidence has been referred to 
as propensity and/or similar fact evidence. The first significant New South Wales case in this area was 
Makin v Attorney General of New South Wales [1894] AC 57, a ‘baby farming’ case. The Makins were 
convicted of the murder of an infant that had been committed to their care. At issue was the 
admissibility and significance of the evidence that multiple bodies of infants had been found buried in 
the backyards of a number of houses that had been occupied by the Makins. See Anne Cossins, The 
Baby-Farmers (Allen & Unwin, 2013).  
4
 Recent reports of the National Academy of Sciences in the US, as well the UK, have drawn attention 
to significant methodological and epistemological deficiencies inherent in the majority of comparative 
forensic ‘sciences’ that are routinely relied on in courts. These include, but are not limited to, little or 
no independent information about the validity or reliability of the majority of techniques and no testing 
of the accuracy of conclusions and opinions proffered by forensic ‘experts’, particularly in the 
comparison fields. See Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National 
Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 2009); Report of the Expert Working Group on 
Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis: Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the 
Practice through a Systems Approach (National Institute of Standards and Technology, National 
Institute of Justice (USA), February 2012); The Fingerprint Inquiry Report ‘Lord Campbell’s Report’ 
(The Fingerprint Inquiry (Scotland), 14 December 2011, 
http://www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inquiry/3127-2.html, accessed 13 March 2013) and 
the report of the Goudge Inquiry: Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario 
(Queens Printer, 2008). For discussion, see, for example: Paul C. Giannelli, “The 2009 NAS Forensic 
Science Report: A Literature Review” (2012) 48 Criminal Law Bulletin 378; Gary Edmond, “Is 
Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in International and 
Interdisciplinary Perspective” (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 30; Gary Edmond 
and Kent Roach, “A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and 
Medical Evidence” (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 343; and Simon Cole, “Who Speaks 
for Science? A Response to the National Academy of Sciences’ Report on Forensic Science” (2010) 
9(1) Law, Probability and Risk 25. A striking feature of recent Australian cases, even those that have 
rejected the admissibility of the comparison evidence proffered by the Crown such Morgan v The 
Queen [2011] NSWCCA 257, or the cases discussed below that have overturned convictions based on 
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thorough the particular medico-legal complex that has arisen around unexplained 
infant death, and in doing so offers principles that could be usefully applied in other 
contexts. And so this review engages also with the responsibilities of courts when 
faced with uncertain or conflicting expert testimony of the kind that was presented in 
Folbigg’s case, and more broadly the failure or inadequacy of current admissibility 
standards and conventional trial safeguards when it comes to adequately managing the 
expert evidence in this and other recent cases.
5
  
 
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood provides a detailed and nuanced analysis of the 
ways in which the Crown and the defence cases were respectively enabled and 
constrained by normative ideals of motherhood. Ideals that the Folbigg case showed 
to be extraordinarily, even unexpectedly, persistent and powerful. In particular the 
difficulties faced by the defence in trying to counter the prejudicial effects that flowed 
from the complex expectations attached to (good) mothering, refracted through the 
figure of Folbigg as the failed mother. Murder, Medicine and Motherhood makes the 
case that the deployment of these narratives, in combination with the expert evidence, 
was critical to the success of the Crown’s case, and the failure of each appeal. And as 
other cases in comparable jurisdictions have been revisited and convictions 
overturned, the lingering effects of the Crown’s account of Folbigg’s suspect, failed 
mothering, continues to set her case apart.
6
  
                                                                                                                                                              
flawed expert testimony, is the lack of reference to contemporary research and reports. Compare the 
US experience where the report was at least cited within three months of its publication: see Giannelli, 
above. See also Stuart Washington, “Tainted evidence in the dock”, The Sydney Morning Herald News 
Review (online), 17 December 2011 (http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/tainted-evidence-science-in-the-
dock-20111216-1oyn7.html, accessed 23 March 2013) and Stuart Washington, “Appeals spark concern 
over use of scientific evidence”, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 17 December 2011 
(http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/appeals-spark-concern-over-use-of-scientific-evidence-
20111216-1oyjb.html, accessed 23 March 2013). 
5
 While these recent cases, particularly in New South Wales, have thrown into sharp relief problems 
with the forensic sciences more broadly, the most high profile Australian miscarriage of justice that sits 
ever present in the background is the Chamberlain case, a conviction based on, among other things, 
suspect and flawed expert evidence and accompanied by media/popular narratives that judged 
Chamberlain’s behaviour to be inconsistent with innocence. Notable in this case was the failure of 
subsequent appellate review, with the High Court confirming Chamberlain’s conviction, despite being 
aware of the shortcomings in the expert evidence. On Chamberlain, see, Deborah Staines, Michelle 
Arrow and Katherine Biber (eds), The Chamberlain Case: Nation, Law, Memory (Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, 2009). 
6
 This is taking into account that the most obvious element of the case against Folbigg, relied on both to 
ground her conviction, and to distinguish her conviction from other comparable cases, was the 
dependence on her diaries, containing passages that were interpreted as incriminating admissions. This 
allowed the courts to side-step questions about the medical evidence as well as the full implications of 
the decisions in other jurisdictions quashing the convictions of mothers who had been initially 
convicted of the murder of their children, the most significant being R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 
1 and R v Clarke [2003] EWCA Crim1020. This is clear in all of the decisions relating to her case, 
including the 2005 appellate decision that upheld her conviction, and in the hearing in the High Court 
when her application for Special Leave was refused. Briefing advice in 2004 (from the Criminal Law 
Review Division, presumably for the NSW Attorney General) also emphasised the significance of the 
diaries when offering a reassurance that the emerging scandal concerning the wrongful convictions of 
Sally Clarke and Angela Cannings would not affect the case against Folbigg. While superficially the 
diaries appeared as independent evidence of guilt, as Emma’s account makes clear, this incriminating 
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In discussing why Emma’s analysis of the case is so compelling, I want to also draw 
some connections between the narratives that were allowed to run in Folbigg and 
some other recent Australian cases. The most direct comparisons can be drawn 
between Folbigg’s trial and the trial of Keli Lane, who was convicted, in 2010, of the 
murder of her newborn baby Tegan, born in 1995.
7
 Lane bears closer analysis in 
relation to Folbigg, not only because she too was convicted of killing her child, but 
also because, like Folbigg, she was prosecuted by perhaps New South Wales’ most 
successful Crown Prosecutor, Mark Tedeschi. In comparing the two cases, there are 
some striking similarities in the narratives deployed against Folbigg and those 
deployed against Lane. But there are two other significant cases that can be drawn in 
for comparison. The first is the long running case of Gordon Wood, who was 
convicted in 2008, of the murder of his girlfriend Caroline Byrne who died in 1995, 
only to be acquitted in 2012.
8
 The second is the equally long running case of Jeffrey 
Gilham, who was convicted in 2009 of the 1993 murder of his parents, and also 
acquitted in 2012.
9
 These two cases speak to the related, but also broader question of 
how courts manage (or fail to manage) incriminating expert evidence, and, like 
Folbigg, speak to the failures of the adversarial trial and safeguards to adequately 
manage the expert evidence in the case, and in particular the failure of the ‘safeguard’ 
that is prosecutorial restraint—prosecutorial obligations of fairness that are a 
                                                                                                                                                              
reading of the diaries does not sit in isolation from the gendered narratives and norms brought to bear 
on Folbigg, and in many respects is dependent on them. Further, it is not clear when the content of the 
diaries may also have been available to the experts who ultimately concluded that the Folbigg children 
could not have died of natural causes, though clearly by the time the case came to trial they would have 
been aware of the more adverse and damaging passages. 
7
 R v Keli Lane [2011] NSWSC 289. Lane lodged her appeal in April 2011. It was heard by the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal on 23 July 2013. Lane’s application for bail was refused by 
Justice Hoeben on 28 February 2013: Keli Lane v R [2013] NSWSC 146. . 
8
 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21. Byrne’s death was initially assumed to be suicide—her body was 
found at the base of cliffs at The Gap, a coastal area in Sydney that is an infamous suicide spot. See, for 
example, Katrina Clifford and Glenn Mitchell, “‘The Killer Point’: Contemporary Reconfigurations of 
The Gap as Crime Scene” (2009) 13 Law Text Culture 80. Sustained pressure from Byrne’s family, 
combined with the emergence of apparently independent expert evidence that indicated that the 
location of her body precluded a suicide jump, and instead indicated that she had been thrown from the 
cliff, led to Wood being extradited from the United Kingdom to face trial. Wood’s first trial was 
aborted after it was discovered that members of the jury had independently visited The Gap.  
9
 Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131. The facts in Gilham are equally extraordinary. Jeffrey Gilham’s 
account was that his parents had been stabbed by his older brother, Christopher, and that he, Jeffrey, 
had come upon Christopher in the act of attempting to light a fire over the body of his mother. Jeffrey’s 
account was that he had picked up the same knife and pursued and killed his brother, before raising the 
alarm. Gilham pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his brother, arguing provocation, and this plea was 
accepted. Much later, following a sustained campaign by Gilham’s uncle, Jeffrey Gilham was charged 
with the murder of his parents—the Crown case being that he had in fact killed all three members of 
his family. The necessary corollary of this case theory was that Gilham had deliberately set fire to the 
family home in order to conceal the murders, and further that he had concocted evidence that 
Christopher was unstable, and resentful of both his parents and his brother, as part of an elaborate, 
premeditated cover up. For an overview of the legal issues in these two cases see Gary Edmond, David 
Hamer, and Andrew Ligertwood, “Expert Evidence after Morgan, Wood and Gilham” (2012) 112 
Precedent 28. 
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prominent feature of the rhetoric underpinning the conduct of criminal trials in 
Australia.
10
 
 
These other recent appellate decisions are worth noting in part also because of the 
involvement of Mark Tedeschi in the prosecutions. Gordon Wood, like Folbigg, was 
prosecuted by Tedeschi. The issues that gave rise to the successful appeal were 
numerous and complex; critically they included the reliance on inadequate and 
erroneous expert evidence to support the Crown case.
11
 But arguably, at the heart of 
the appeal was the conduct of the prosecution, the unsupported and speculative (and 
sometimes conflicting) narratives spun out of the circumstantial case against Wood. 
As McClellan CJ wrote in the appeal, “[t]he difficulties which the prosecutor's 
conduct created are so significant that I am satisfied it caused the trial to miscarry 
occasioning a miscarriage of justice.”12  
 
Gilham’s case similarly raised questions about prosecutorial conduct, in combination 
with a reliance on equivocal expert evidence. Tedeschi prosecuted Gilham’s first trial, 
which ended in a hung jury, and it is certainly arguable that the Crown case, as run in 
the second trial by Margaret Cunneen, was built on the foundations laid by 
Tedeschi.
13
 One of the striking aspects of this case, that maps back to Folbigg, was 
the manner in which the Crown Prosecutor was able to draw inferences from the 
expert evidence far beyond those which it was capable of bearing, but presented these 
                                                        
10
 See, for example, Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque, “The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and 
the Frailty of the Criminal Trial” (2012) 24(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51. The recent 
AHRC inquiry into the use of discredited techniques for age determination is also worth noting here: 
An Age of Uncertainty: Inquiry into the Treatment of Individuals Suspected of People Smuggling 
Offences Who Say they are Children (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012). See also the 
reopening of the case against David Eastman, convicted in 1995 of the murder of a senior police 
officer, in part because of fresh concerns relating to the expert evidence proffered at the trial. See Louis 
Andrews, “Eastman gets his new day in court”, The Canberra Times, 11 August 2012, 1, 4 and B1. 
11
 The appellate court was highly critical of the expert evidence presented by Associate Professor Rod 
Cross that underpinned the Crown case that Byrne had been thrown from the cliff. In particular, what 
emerged on appeal was not only the weaknesses in the evidence itself, but also the fact that Cross had 
inserted himself into the investigation, and prosecution, of the case in a way that overstepped the 
boundaries of expert impartiality and by implication breached the Expert Code of Conduct: see Wood, 
above n 8, [715] ff. Despite this, the appeal court appears to have accepted that neither the breach nor 
the apparent weaknesses rendered his evidence inadmissible. A video that includes an interview with 
Cross and footage of one of the experiments—male police officers throwing (compliant) female 
officers into a swimming pool—can be viewed at http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/trial-expert-stands-firm-
as-judge-questions-impartiality-20120225-1tv48.html (accessed 29 March 2013).  In Gilham, the 
Crown likewise relied on speculative experiments conducted by a fire examiner, presented to the jury 
by way of a DVD of a ‘reconstruction’ that bore little resemblance to the actual conditions of the fire 
that had been lit on the night of the Gilhams’ deaths. In this instance the appellate court held that the 
expert’s evidence and the DVD of the ‘reconstruction’ ought to have been excluded (under s 137 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law)—the probative value of the experiments being so slight as to be misleading 
and thus unfairly prejudicial to the accused: Gilham, above n 9, [179]. 
12
 Wood, above n 8, [604]. 
13
 See Gilham, above n 9, [107] and Paul Bibby, “Scientific evidence flaws highlighted”, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 27 June 2012 (www.smh.com.au/nsw/scientific-evidence-flaws-highlighted-
20120626-210my.html, accessed 11 March 2013). 
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to the jury as legitimate, available, almost inevitable conclusions. In particular, in 
Gilham, the Prosecutor was allowed to make repeated reference to the conclusions 
that could be drawn from the pattern of stab wounds present in all three bodies; in 
characterising the matter as one of common sense, the Crown invited the jury to 
conclude that it defied belief that more than one person was responsible, such was the 
similarity of the pattern and number of stab wounds.
14
 This was despite the fact that a 
number of the expert witnesses in the trial had disavowed such conclusions and had 
been explicitly prevented from giving evidence along these lines.
15
 This was 
compounded by the Crown’s failure to call, as part of its case, Professor Cordner who 
of all the experts was the most unequivocal in emphasising that it was not possible to 
draw meaningful conclusions from the pattern and number of wounds.
16
 Further 
weaknesses in the expert evidence relied on in Gilham’s prosecution emerged after 
the trial, with one of the witnesses, whose evidence had been crucial in establishing 
the sequence of events, and in particular the sequence of death(s), admitting in the 
appeal hearing in 2011 that they had exceeded their expertise when they had given 
this incriminating evidence in the trial.
17
 In all of these cases attempts by the trial 
judge, and defence, to maintain control of the presentation of the evidence were 
ineffective, or, worse, generated misunderstandings.
18
  
                                                        
14
 Gilham, above n 9, [348]. 
15
 The appeal court characterised the Crown’s conduct, in this respect, as an egregious departure from 
the limits set by the trial judge and in fact that the evidence was inadmissible for that purpose. A 
notable aspect of the trial was that at no point did the court engage with the coincidence (or tendency) 
rules that, given the conclusions that the jury was being invited to draw, ought to have operated to 
manage the admissibility of the evidence: Gilham, above n 9,  [288], [327] ff, [348]-[350]. The appeal 
court also noted that the defence failed to object (or identify) that the Crown’s case relied on 
coincidence reasoning: Gilham, above n 9, [325]. 
16
 Gilham, above n 9,  [383] ff. This had the curious effect of limiting the manner in which the defence 
could respond; the limits placed on the prosecution experts produced the appearance of a conservative 
or cautious approach, but in operation hampered the defence attempts to proffer rebuttal evidence 
disputing the (apparent) significance of the injuries found on all three members of the Gilham family. 
On a related point, see Simon Cole, “Splitting Hairs? Evaluating 'Split Testimony' as an Approach to 
the Problem of Forensic Expert Evidence” (2011) 33(3) Sydney Law Review 459 and Gary Edmond et 
al., “Atkins v The Emperor: The ‘Cautious’ Use of Unreliable ‘Expert’ Opinion” (2010) 14(2) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 146. 
17
 Gilham, above n 9, [621]. The emergence of this concession during the appeal hearing, apparently 
unanticipated by both the prosecution and the defence, marked a turning point in the appeal. Gilham, 
unlike Wood, was present at the hearing, and was released on bail immediately, at the conclusion of the 
appeal hearing, with the court indicating that he was entitled, at the very least, to a retrial: see, for 
example, Paul Bibby, “Gilham's champagne moment: Free to celebrate after murder conviction 
quashed”, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 2 December 2011 
(http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/gilhams-champagne-moment-free-to-celebrate-after-murder-conviction-
quashed-20111202-1o9wb.html, accessed 11 March 2013). 
18
 In appearing to accept that there was no empirical basis that would allow an expert to conclude that 
the wounds were inflicted by the same person, and thus preventing the experts from testifying as to 
whether, or not, the patterns and number of wounds could be seen as significant in this way, the trial 
judge none the less emphasised that it was open to the jury to determine whether the apparent similarity 
was significant: Gilham, above n 9, [298]. The conceptual confusion is perhaps a striking example of 
the lack of clarity as to the role, relevance and function of expert opinion. It also bears a family 
resemblance to the conceptual confusion attending the admission of the expert opinions in cases such 
as Folbigg, and the trials of Clarke and Canning, where the opinions of the experts were founded on a 
form of concealed or occluded coincidence reasoning (see discussion below n 32). 
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So, all of these more recent cases bear some comparison to Folbigg, if one is thinking 
about the problems raised by the expert evidence. But turning back to Lane, the case 
that bears the closest relationship in terms of the narratives of ideal(ised) or normative 
motherhood, I wanted to start with an image. In this double page spread from the 
popular weekly magazine, Woman’s Day, we have the headline “Baby Killer 
Mums”.19 In contrast to Emma’s careful, systematic and illuminating analysis of the 
media coverage of Folbigg’s case—that manages to combine a discourse analysis of 
the representation of Folbigg herself, with an account of the imbalance between the 
reporting of the prosecution and defence narratives—I am relying on this one image 
to set the tone. I am using it here not to point to the simplistic popular media coverage 
endemic to these cases, but because it sets Folbigg alongside three other recent 
Australian cases where women have been convicted of the murder of their child, one 
of whom is Keli Lane.  
 
 
 
The case against Lane was entirely speculative and circumstantial. She had fallen 
pregnant in 1996, giving birth to Tegan on 12 September 1996. Lane had successfully 
concealed the pregnancy from family and friends, including, according to the 
evidence, her then partner.
20
 Lane had previously carried a child to term in 1995, a 
girl who had been adopted out, and two previous pregnancies had ended in 
                                                        
19
 This article by Matthew Benns, “This prison houses our worst Baby Killer Mums”, appeared in the 
Woman’s Day in the first half of 2012 (image provided 5 June 2012). 
20
  The Crown case is summarised in R v Lane [2011] NSWCCA 157, [43]. 
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terminations.
21
 In 1999, Lane had a third child, a boy, who was also adopted out. With 
the exception of the first pregnancy and termination, which was known (only) to her 
then boyfriend, all of these other pregnancies had, apparently, been successfully 
concealed from family and friends.
22
 In the case of baby Tegan, the defence case was 
that Lane had handed the baby over to the (initially unnamed) natural father. There 
was no body, no admission, and no direct evidence. The circumstantial evidence 
supporting the case was primarily negative, including the inferences to be drawn from 
the failure to locate the surviving child or man that Lane had claimed was the father 
of Tegan. Which is to say that, in addition to the reliance on hegemonic gendered 
narratives, the Crown case was strongly dependent on what was argued to be the sheer 
implausibility of her account. This appeal to (im)plausibility was implicated in the 
decision to allow the jury to draw some limited inferences from Keli Lane’s conduct, 
in particular, what were said to be lies.
23
 Perhaps even more than Folbigg or Wood, 
this was the case of Tedeschi’s career, considered to be the impossible conviction. 
And it was a case that clearly troubled the trial judge. In the sentencing judgment, 
Justice Whealy of the New South Wales Supreme Court, said, “whatever views I may 
have had about the strength of the Crown case must take second place to the jury 
verdict.”24 More recently, on his retirement, and in what has been widely regarded as 
a surprising and controversial move, Justice Whealy has spoken publicly about his 
unease at the outcome of the case.
25
   
 
The four women discussed in this article also present, and represent, a range of 
different scenarios of failed or feckless motherhood. Folbigg, concealing her murders 
behind the screen of multiple cot deaths, is perhaps the most reviled, whereas Lane’s 
conduct places her into a different category, and most closely resembles the 
traditional picture of an infanticide. In contrast to both of these we have Rachel 
Pfitzner and the unnamed mother of Ebony—both parents whose children had come 
to the attention of the overstretched child welfare apparatus (including the Department 
                                                        
21
 Tedeschi argued that Lane murdered Tegan because she was unwilling to go through either the 
distress (or inconvenience) of an adoption, or the trauma of a termination: see R v Keli Lane, above n 7, 
[81]. 
22
 Perhaps most extraordinarily, Lane had played in a competitive water polo match the day before 
giving birth to her first daughter, Tahlia Rose, on 19 March 1995: R v Keli Lane, above n 7, [5]. 
23
 In particular the jury was allowed to draw the inference that the lies were told because of a 
‘consciousness of guilt’ and were thus directly probative of guilt, overruling the trial judge on this 
point. The NSWCCA pointed to fact that the defence case did not name the father and that the evidence 
that the jury could use to ground its conclusion that Lane’s account of handing the baby to a man called 
Andrew Norris/Morris (the putative natural father), was not ‘entirely co-extensive with the 
circumstantial case relied on to prove the murder’. See R v Lane, above n 20, per Simpson J, [62]. It 
seems as if, like the fact of the rarity of multiple infant deaths, this negative evidence that was the 
failure to find Morris/Norris (and therefore Tegan), becomes ‘double counted’. See discussion in n 32 
below. 
24
 These remarks were reportedly made at the sentencing hearing: Kim Arlington, “Tearful Lane faces 
sentencing hearing”, The Sydney Morning Herald (online) 11 March 2011 
(http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/tearful-keli-lane-faces--sentencing-hearing-20110311-1bql7.html, 
accessed 24 March 2013). In his written sentencing reasons (above n 7) Justice Whealy is perhaps 
more circumspect, but reading between the lines it is evident that he is uneasy about elements of the 
Crown case. 
25
 Deborah Snow, “Judge reveals his doubts over Keli Lane conviction”, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 24 November 2012 (http://www.smh.com.au/national/judge-reveals-his-doubts-over-keli-
lane-conviction-20121123-29yut.html, accessed 24 March 2013).  
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of Community Services),
26
 Pfitzner’s case raising also the added complexities of race, 
involving as it did the death of an Aboriginal boy caused by his white mother. It is 
perhaps worth noticing that with Folbigg, the experts (and ultimately the courts) were 
dealing with what they saw as an exceptional case; it was the very rarity of the four 
deaths in one family that, in a sense and in the end, raised the alarm.
27
 But alongside, 
running as a counterpoint to cases such as Folbigg, there is that routine, heavily 
bureaucratised space of child protection, risk assessments, welfare interventions, 
family placements and child removals—the folk devils and moral panics of child 
welfare discourse that in Australia provoked the Northern Territory Intervention with 
its targeting of Aboriginal parents and families
28—that operates as an echo chamber 
for the apparently disruptive, exceptional, spectacular criminal case of maternal 
filicide. 
 
And so, Emma’s book speaks of Folbigg’s case as providing us with what Fitizpatrick 
calls a ‘telling instance’. That is to say we can read off the case, it allows us to see 
further, to see broader patterns—and in these telling moments, the case itself can 
function both as evidence and as authority, it is both reflective and generative. It is a 
case that can tell us about social expectations and constructions of motherhood (and 
indeed fatherhood) even as it reconstructs and reinforces them, and exposes particular 
vulnerabilities in the criminal justice system, compounding what might otherwise be 
an ordinary failure to manage the expert forensic evidence.  Related to this and more 
familiar to me is Robert Hariman’s conception of a ‘popular trial’ and also Nancy 
Fraser’s analysis of moments of what she terms ‘hyperpublicity’. For Hariman a 
popular trial is a particular class of  ‘persuasive event’, a social performance of the 
law that functions to create social knowledge, perhaps even, though not entirely in the 
                                                        
26
 Seven year old Ebony died as a result of long term deprivation and neglect. Ebony’s parents were 
both tried, with her mother convicted of murder and her father of manslaughter: R v BW & SW (No 3) 
[2009] NSWSC 1043 (2 October 2009). Rachel Pfitzner pleaded guilty to the murder of her two year 
old son, Dean Shillingsworth: R v Pfitzner [2009] NSWSC 1267. In both cases it was conceded that the 
Department of Community Services had failed to adequately respond to reports about risks facing the 
children (and the families) involved. See The Death of Ebony: The Need for an Effective Interagency 
Response to Children at Risk (New South Wales Ombudsman, Special Report to Parliament under 
section 31 of the Ombudsman Act 1974, October 2009) and The Death of Dean Shillingsworth: Critical 
Challenges in the Context of Reforms to the Child Protection System (New South Wales Ombudsman, 
Special Report to Parliament under section 31 of the Ombudsman Act 1974, December 2009). Both 
cases were catalysts for the establishment of a Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection 
Services in NSW, headed by Justice James Wood AO QC. 
27
 It was the death of Folbigg’s fourth child, Laura, which prompted a revisiting of the conclusions with 
respect to the prior children, whose deaths had initially been attributed to SIDS. 
28
 An investigation into child abuse within Indigenous communities culminated in the Little Children 
are Sacred report that identified endemic and entrenched problems within Indigenous communities and 
made a number of recommendations. The extent to which the recommendations have been 
implemented is contested, but the report was used as the trigger, by the then conservative government, 
for rapid deployment of inconsistent and punitive health, welfare and legal regimes across communities 
in the Northern Territory Emergency Response.  See, more generally, John Chesterman and Heather 
Douglas, “Law on Australia’s Northern Frontier: The Fall and Rise of Race” (2009) 24(1) Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society 69. 
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old fashioned sense, ideologically.
29
 For Fraser, these moments are events that break 
our routine, provoke widespread attention, and consequently have, as she puts it, 
“great diagnostic value,” making visible the “structures of inequality and practices of 
power that deform public opinion making in ordinary times, less obtrusively but more 
systematically.”30  
 
So Folbigg can tell us much about the faith in and the failures of the adversarial 
criminal trial and forensic sciences, the structures and practices that function to 
impede public accountability mechanisms such as the criminal trial. And in this 
respect it is like other recent cases, such as Wood and Gilham. But taking Fitzpatrick, 
Hariman and Fraser’s framing a little further, the Folbigg case can be both aligned 
with, but also distinguished from, say Wood and Gilham. Because while, like Folbigg, 
these two cases can tell us much about the systematic failures of the criminal trial, 
about what can go wrong in even well resourced cases, or about the under-considered 
relationship between prosecutorial obligations and the use of incriminating expert 
evidence, and they are certainly sensational cases, they are not ‘telling’ in quite the 
same way. Emma’s book is special, I think, because she manages to show how 
Folbigg’s case is telling in the Fizpatrick sense, popular on Hariman’s terms, and 
diagnostic in the Fraser sense. Most clearly in these terms, Emma charts what this 
case can tell us about ideologies of motherhood—as well as historical and current 
discourses of women, criminality and violence—as it also hints at the relevance of 
‘postfeminism’ as a complicating cross-narrative. And, as I discuss further below, it 
manages to combine this with a careful, pragmatic account of how courts could do 
better when faced, as they will inevitably be, with conflicting or uncertain forensic 
evidence, particularly in situations where such evidence is especially vulnerable to an 
insidious form of coproduction.
31
 
                                                        
29
 Robert Hariman, “Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social Knowledge” in Robert Hariman 
(ed), Popular Trials: Rhetoric, Mass Media, and the Law (University of Alabama Press, 1990). See 
also Barry Brummet, “Mediating the Laws: Popular Trials and the Mass Media” in the same volume.  
30
 Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition (Routledge, 
1997) 99.  
31
 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood draws on work by Sheila Jasanoff in characterising the 
relationships between the courts and science/expertise as one of coproduction: see Science at the Bar: 
Law, Science and Technology in America (Harvard University Press, 1995). See also Bruno Latour, 
Science in Action (Harvard University Press, 1987). Coproduction provides a useful framework for 
understanding that when it comes to the generation of expert knowledge within and for a legal dispute, 
a reciprocal relationship of influence, like the dimension of interpretation, is likely to be inevitable, and 
is not necessarily suspect. However, in a case such as Folbigg, dealing as it does with a diagnosis, and 
medical literature, that is complex, contested and inflected by normative ideologies, these dynamics 
operate in ways that are not only hegemonic, but also particularly difficult for the defence to expose 
adequately.  Even in a case such as Wood where the ‘coproduction’, and indeed the deficiencies of the 
expert evidence, appear in retrospect to be so transparent as to be almost (blackly) comic, none the less 
a well resourced and experienced defence was unable to counter effectively the inherent weaknesses in 
Cross’s evidence, nor to adequately reveal his involvement in the investigation. As discussed further 
below (see n 61 and surrounding discussion), developing what Emma terms a robust account of the 
reciprocal relationships between science and law is a necessary part of developing an adequate 
response to the management of expertise and expert knowledge within the trial. See also, in a related 
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But turning first to what Emma’s account tells us about how the trial and indeed the 
appeals, constructed and flattened out Folbigg’s experience of mothering, in such a 
way as to provide, in the absence of definitive, reliable evidence that could point to 
how her children died, and in the face of significant known challenges in overseas 
jurisdictions to the use of ‘coincidence’, evidence that relied on the pattern of four 
unexplained deaths as an indicia of murder, proof of guilt.
32
 In this respect the use of 
Folbigg’s diaries was critical, but more than this, the narrative constructed by 
Tedeschi, elements of which were repeated in the case against Keli Lane, managed to 
create a situation where every action by Folbigg was able to be constructed as 
suspicious, leaving her, and her defence, very little room to move when it came to 
countering what became an apparently overwhelming case.  
 
To begin, and in the context of the admissibility rules that governed the (joint) trial, 
there are significant cross-overs between thinking about the rules of evidence and 
thinking about the gendered narratives running through the case, perhaps most 
significant being the way in which the Crown managed to use the coincidence rules 
not only as the conceptual framework for thinking about the (damning) significance 
of the four unexplained deaths, but also, and equally as damaging, as the means of 
rendering the largely inevitable consequences of the gendered division of labour 
                                                                                                                                                              
vein, Gary Edmond, “Supersizing Daubert Science for Litigation and its Implications for Legal 
Practice and Scientific Research” (2007) 52 Villanova Law Review 857. 
32
 Most prominent here was the realisation that the ‘statistical’ evidence—that the chances of three 
natural infant deaths in one family was 1 in 73 million—presented by Sir Roy Meadows in the 
prosecutions of Angela Cannings and Sally Clark was simply wrong. The so called ‘Meadows’ Law’—
variously expressed, but most commonly rendered along the lines of ‘one is tragedy, two is suspicious, 
three is murder’—was equally spurious: see discussion of Cannings and Clark in Murder, Medicine 
and Motherhood, 8-11 and in Chapters 4 and 5. Folbigg’s committal hearing occurred prior to these 
cases, and similar spurious statistics were proffered at that hearing: Lee Glendinning, “Four dead by 
their mother’s hand”, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 22 May 2003 
(http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/21/1053196642652.html, accessed 23 March 2013). 
However, by the time it came to trial, the discrediting of Meadows meant that the evidence was 
confined to more generalised statements as to the ‘rarity’ of such multiple deaths. However, just as 
problematically, their experience as to rarity of four natural (or unexplained) deaths in one family was 
still canvassed in the questioning of the expert witnesses, at the same time that the fact of the rarity was 
being characterised by the trial judge as a matter of common sense and within the province and 
knowledge of the jury (see discussion, above n 18).  The conceptual confusion made it much harder to 
decouple the fact of rarity from the uncertainty as to the cause of death. By contrast, in Matthey, the 
trial judge was far clearer as to the need to separate out, conceptually, the question of the rarity of 
multiple deaths from the expert opinion as to cause of death. And thus the lack of agreement in the 
medical evidence was able to come to the fore, and in many respects this compelled the conclusion that 
Matthey’s case could not be safely sent to a jury: see Matthey [2007] VSC 398, per Coldrey J, [188]-
[192], [199]. A similar point is made in R v Phillips [1999] NSWSC 1175: see Murder, Medicine and 
Motherhood, 6, 195. See also Gaudron J’s dissent in Velevski which supports the view that a jury faced 
with a fundamental conflict in the expert evidence on a critical point—and in the absence of 
sufficiently compelling alternative evidence upon which to base a verdict— must have a reasonable 
doubt: Velevski v The Queen [2002] HCA 4, [86], [112]. Further, given that it was acknowledged that 
the jury had accessed additional information about Folbigg, there is at least a strong possibility that 
they also came across the media reports of the committal hearing, including the reporting of the 
(spurious) numbers: see n 43 below. 
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within the Folbigg household as suspicious. As Emma tracks in detail, the list of 
similarities relied on to show that the evidence had “significant probative value” such 
that it could be used to determine whether Folbigg had killed the children included: 
 
 (iii) each death occurred in the child's own cot or bed; 
(iv) each death or ALTE occurred during a sleep period; 
(v) each child was last seen alive by the accused; 
(vi) each child was found not breathing by the accused, and in relation to those who 
died in the night, she claimed to have observed from a distance, and in the dark, that 
they had stopped breathing; 
(vii) only the accused was awake or present at the time when each child was found 
dead or not breathing; 
(viii) there was, in each case, a short interval between the time when the child was 
last claimed to have been seen alive by the accused, and the time when he or she was 
found lifeless or not breathing properly; 
(ix) in relation to the children who died in their cots or had an ALTE in the night, the 
accused had got up to go to the toilet, and in some cases had returned to bed, before 
getting up again and sounding the alarm; 
(x) the accused had failed to pick up or attempt to resuscitate any of the children after 
the discovery of his or her death or cessation of breathing (subject to her claim to 
have done so in relation to Laura);…
33
 
Of particular note here is the attempt to read something significant in terms of the 
probative value into the fact that it was Folbigg who was getting up at night, and who 
thus was the parent who raised the alarm.  Tedeschi’s success in framing care as 
suspect is apparent when you consider the extraordinary language he uses in 
describing Folbigg finding her children dead after checking on them while getting up 
                                                        
33
 R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 12, [11]. See the discussion in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 
Chapter 6, especially 107 ff. The Crown closing address rendered these similarities slightly differently 
and as Emma points out, the list of similarities itself mutated as the case worked its way through the 
system—what was initially presented when the Crown was arguing that the cases could, and should, be 
tried together was reframed at trial. And as the list of similarities shifted, and the Crown was precluded 
from relying on reasoning of the type offered in the trials of Clarke and Canning, the presence of the 
diaries became more and more critical to shoring up the appropriateness of the conviction. Note also 
that in the 2005 appeal, Justice Sully performed what seems to be a rather extraordinary move when he 
relied on the interlocutory judgment in Canning to support the conclusion that the probative value of 
the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of (unfair) prejudice and thus neither s 101, nor s 137 
should operate in Folbigg to exclude the evidence. And this is notwithstanding that his Honour had, in 
the same judgment, previously cited the Court of Appeal’s warning, in overturning Canning’s 
convictions, to be cautious about falling into the trap of “taking the wrong starting point” when dealing 
with the inferences that can be drawn from rarity. See R v Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 23, per Sully J, 
[156], [12]. 
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to go to the toilet. As Emma recounts, he first expresses disbelief that a sleep deprived 
mother would (need to) get up to go to the toilet during the night, and then goes on to 
say, in his closing address,  “her going to the toilet was very dangerous for these 
children. … Gosh you’d be telling her not to check on them.” And as Emma 
emphasises, what should have been much clearer, to the trial judge and indeed the 
appellate courts—and this is putting aside the descriptive circular similarities that are 
necessarily present in a case where the deaths of four children from the same family 
are being heard together—the fact that Folbigg was the primary caregiver explains 
most of the ‘striking similarities’ that underpinned the joint trial and the admissibility 
of the evidence as evidence that can be used to negate coincidence.
34
 Counter-
intuitively the Crown was able to convert Folbigg’s ‘good mothering’, her active 
parenting and role as primary caregiver, into evidence that substantiated her guilt. 
And while this was a point that the defence made some attempt to articulate, in the 
end it was unable to make this point strongly or clearly enough, faced as it was with 
the difficulty of simultaneously trying to frame Folbigg as a caring, ideal, 
unambiguously good mother, who dressed her children neatly and was consistently 
attentive to their needs.
35
  
 
So, faced with a mother who in many respects conformed to the ideal—she gave up 
work, she devoted herself to her children, she to all outside appearances put the 
interests of her children ahead of herself, and she had, nonetheless tragically, lost 
those children—the Crown case as run by Tedeschi does a number of things, many of 
them familiar and predicable manoeuvres. It is perhaps this that makes them in many 
ways so striking—because what Emma’s book points to is the resilience of normative 
constructions of motherhood, in the face of sustained critique from feminist 
commentators, and despite the circulation of what appears to be a more forgiving 
social and popular discourse about the challenges of parenting (mothering) in 
contemporary times.  
                                                        
34
 And noting, also, that admission of this evidence was thought at the time to require that there be “no 
rational explanation consistent with innocence”. See above n 3. Which ought to have given the court 
pause when considering a list of ‘similarities’ that not only relied on Folbigg’s role as primary care-
giver, but also sought to draw significance from the fact that, in common with most small children, the 
Folbigg children spent time at home in their cots, asleep. In contrast, Justice Coldrey in Matthey points 
out that the fact that the children died alone while in the company of their primary carer has minimal, if 
any, probative value: R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398, [193]. While it is important to acknowledge that by 
the time the appeal in relation to Folbigg’s conviction was heard the admissibility terrain had shifted 
somewhat, the courts also seem to envisage that even more problematically, the evidence describing 
the circumstances surrounding the deaths can be used to ground a conclusion as to a probative tendency 
of the accused (to lose her temper with her children?) as a step in the reasoning process towards guilt, 
which tends to occlude the risks and slippages involved in relying on evidence of tendency. This 
approach is consistent with trends in more recent cases in New South Wales involving the use of 
tendency evidence as an intermediary step, representing what is arguably a problematic lowering of the 
admissibility threshold: see for example Regina v PWD [2010] NSWCCA 209. 
35
 The attention drawn to the appearance of the Folbigg children, by witnesses called by the defence, is 
itself striking. Tedeschi’s strategy of discounting the evidence of these supporting witnesses as the 
‘gym girls’ plays, successfully perhaps, into this focus on appearances, emphasising that these 
observers are missing the true picture. See Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 121. 
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First, as one strand of his case, Tedeschi constructs a narrative of resentment and 
thwarted ambition: that, not withstanding her apparent willingness to care for her 
children, in reality Folbigg resented being made to conform, and that she wished to 
return to her ‘former’, self absorbed life. As the Crown case unfolds, it becomes clear 
that, notwithstanding the presence of contemporary counter-narratives that purport to 
be more understanding of the difficulties of fulfilling idealised conceptions of 
motherhood, Folbigg can nonetheless be judged as an unfit mother, for her 
unwillingness, her immaturity, and her emotional inability to perform the proper role 
she has chosen. The Crown emphasises that Kathleen and her husband had made ‘a 
deal’, and this construction of the division of labour within the Folbiggs’ home as a 
choice is an important strategy; it short-circuits the possibility of sympathy, and 
operates ideologically, rendering the historical realities and pressures of the gendered 
division of labour invisible.
36 
Thus she improperly, and contrary to the strictures of 
the Folbigg family, sought opportunities to work, to socialise, to go to the gym, she 
was obsessed with her weight and appearance, she unfairly resented the lack of 
assistance provided by Craig, notwithstanding that she had ‘accepted’ the binary deal 
of breadwinner/caregiver. She wanted to go out dancing.  
 
And in terms of how this narrative persists, it is worth noting that in Keli Lane’s case 
much is made of the fact that on leaving the hospital after the birth of her daughter she 
too goes dancing. The implication is clear, even if one believes her explanation that 
she has handed her child over to its father, that this is not the behaviour of a woman 
who wants to be a mother, who genuinely cares for her child. In the Crown case 
against Lane, she too is obsessed with her weight and appearance and in her case this 
is more explicitly coupled to the norms of a reserved feminine sexuality. Tedeschi’s 
submissions to the jury included pointing out she had, “a very active social and sex 
life. A child was just not part of that picture” and that, “[a] child would put a serious 
dent in these activities . . . as it would have undoubtedly put a dent in her overriding 
sporting ambitions [to play waterpolo for Australia].”37 Coupled with her promiscuity, 
and her unacceptable, self-centred immaturity and ambition, is the expressed disbelief 
that an intelligent, educated woman, from a good family, could have (so many) 
accidental pregnancies.  Even more extraordinarily, Tedeschi argues before the jury 
that the fact that Lane accepts a job while pregnant, knowing that it is due to 
commence shortly after the birth of the child, “show[ed] only too vividly that she had 
no intention of ever taking Tegan home.”38 In Tedeschi’s narrative, all of her actions 
                                                        
36
 The strategic deployment of ‘choice’ being a common incident of both ‘postfeminist’ and 
‘postsocialist’ discourse: see Fraser, above n 30 and also Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism 
and the Politics of Discourse (Routledge, 1993), especially Chapter 4.   
37
 Variations of these comments were widely reported throughout the trial. See, for example, Lisa 
Davies, “Games dream led to murder: Court told of Keli Lane's bizarre Olympic motive” The Daily 
Telegraph (Sydney), 10 August 2010, 1. 
38
 Kim Arlington, “No time for five babies: Keli Lane accused”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 
August 2010, 1. The primary argument in the NSWCCA related to whether an alternative charge of 
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in response to her pregnancies, the adoptions, the terminations, the (alleged) murder, 
become morally equivalent and equally suspect, and all are evidence of her “tendency 
to dispose of her children.”39 It is perhaps too easy to note, also, that according to 
Woman’s Day, Lane remains preoccupied with her weight (though she has lost a lot) 
and the mother of Ebony is likewise obsessed with her hair and make-up. By contrast, 
Folbigg is “fit and well”, she is adjusted to her new life, “prison routine agrees with 
her.” She smiles. 
 
But at the same time, as a further means of undermining Folbigg’s care of her family, 
Tedeschi constructs a narrative of the overbearing, controlling, dominant mother—
obsessed with routines, unwilling to allow the father to contribute—who is headed, 
inevitably, towards a battle of wills in which her children will lose. Just as Tedeschi 
has pointed us to Folbigg’s obsession with her own appearance, he warns us not to be 
fooled by appearances. It is perhaps worth noting here how this maps onto 
conventional understandings of that figure of maternal deception, the MSbP mother 
whose apparent care for her children is in fact a manifestation of a pathological desire 
for attention.
40
And by revealing Kathleen Folbigg’s apparently caring, good, 
mothering as overbearing and potentially monstrous, Tedeschi is able to make far 
more of the cracks in appearances, via the evidence of Craig Folbigg, the evidence of 
expressions of temper and lack of control, that seem to take the defence by surprise 
and places them in an invidious position.
41
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
manslaughter should have been left to the jury. Defending the decision to confine the case to one of  
murder only, the Crown argued that manslaughter (or accidental death)  was inconsistent with her past 
conduct in concealing her past pregnancies and the evidence that she had repeatedly shown that she 
“did not accept the responsibility of caring for the [a?] child.” There was little or no critical discussion 
in the appeal of the language used by Tedeschi, or of the narratives deployed in her trial, though the 
second ground related to the prosecutorial approach and conduct during the trial, in particular the 
posing of questions to the jury in a manner that might displace the Crown’s onus of proof, with 
comparisons drawn between Lane’s trial and the trial of Gordon Wood.  
39
 R v Lane, above n 20, per McClellan J. In its submissions on sentencing, the Crown argued that her 
previous pregnancies could be considered as pointing to the seriousness of her offence: “Mr Chapple 
SC [acting for Lane] submitted that the offence fell at the lowest end of the spectrum in terms of its 
objective seriousness. The Crown did not accept this submission. It referred to aggravating features 
involved, the selfish motives underlying the murder, and the fact that this was not the first time the 
accused had been involved in giving birth to a baby, indeed, a baby she did not intend to keep.” R v 
Keli Lane, above n 7, [36]. 
40
 On the construction of (the contentious and arguably now discredited) Munchausen’s Syndrome by 
Proxy, see discussion in Fiona E Raitt and M Suzanne Zeedyk, “Mothers on Trial: Discourse of Cot 
Death and Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy” (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 257. 
41
 The fact that the accused has experienced expressed irritation becomes one of the ‘striking 
similarities’ in the circumstances leading up to the deaths, not withstanding that the evidence in relation 
to events preceding all four children is equivocal or incomplete. Rather the diaries are used as evidence 
that the accused is acknowledging that she had become stressed while caring for the children, 
particularly the third child, Sarah. It perhaps goes without saying that incidents described are hardly 
unusual in the day to day life of many parents and children, but in an environment where the defence 
strategy relied on characterising Kathleen Folbigg as conforming to an ideal type, it perhaps shied 
away from acknowledging Fobigg’s experience as representative of the imperfect, day to day 
frustrations and conflict that can be generated in the home.  
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Finally, building on the revelation that Folbigg’s mothering was in fact not a 
demonstration of care, but rather a manifestation of her (improper) desire for control, 
Tedeschi uses her diaries as confessionals, as Emma points out, to reveal the ‘true’ 
nature of Folbigg’s mothering by way of the ‘machine’ for reading her true state of 
mind.
 42
 Thus the emphasis on the way that the diaries record this battle of wills, as 
well as Folbigg’s day to day preoccupations, which include comments on her sense of 
her own well being. This point reverberates in the list of ‘striking similarities’ 
described above as well, as they simultaneously rely on and occlude the normative 
ideals of motherhood. Most obviously the expectation that an innocent mother, who is 
truly focused on her children’s needs, would have attempted to resuscitate, to cradle, 
her child is implicit in point (x) above. Thus the Crown case is able to present the 
most striking sections of the diary as unequivocal admissions, isolating the most 
striking phrases out of their full context: “[Craig] has a morbid fear about Laura—he 
well I know theres nothing wrong with her. … Because it was me not them” and 
“Scared that she’ll leave me now. Like Sarah did. I know I was short tempered & 
cruel sometime to her & she left. With a little help”, and also is able to point to 
sections that appear to predict the death of her children.
43
  
 
And the diaries are accepted as revealing Folbigg’s awareness of her own culpability 
by the courts, at each appellate level, as they seek to reassure themselves that Folbigg 
will not become another Sally Clarke or Angela Canning. Emma’s account 
demonstrates the way that the Crown case successfully flattens out ambiguity, 
extending beyond reading what could conceivably be Folbigg’s expressions of her 
sense of guilt and responsibility into admissions and seeping into the reading of all 
aspects of the diaries, so that expressions of ambivalence towards her experiences are 
likewise flattened out—functioning as premonition or as evidence of premeditation—
so that they too can be subjected to an interpretation that reads only one thing between 
the lines.
44
 There is, I suspect, a significant class element at work here. Rather than a 
reading that might allow for a recognition that (women’s) diaries might offer insights 
into the sensibilities and (hidden) capabilities of their author (while also 
acknowledging that they are not a transparent record), in this case the framing of the 
diaries by the Crown—with their mistakes, mundane details and lack of literary 
                                                        
42
 See Chapter 7 in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood. 
43
 Not mentioned in the judgments as a relevant diary entry, but present in the media accounts, was 
Folbigg’s use of the striking phrase, “Obviously, I am my father’s daughter”. Folbigg’s mother had 
been murdered by her father, Thomas Britton, because, according to one newspaper report, “Britton 
was furious over his partner’s severe neglect of Kathleen”, who was then eighteen months old. See 
Stephen Cauchi, “Killing them softly”, The Age (Melbourne), 30 August 2003. It became apparent after 
the trial that the jury had conducted their own research about the case, and had acquired knowledge of 
Folbigg’s family history: Folbigg v R [2007] NSWCCA 37.  
44
 See, for example, in the 2005 appeal, the comment that Folbigg’s ‘admissions’, including that she is 
trying to control her responses to frustration, or that she has lost her temper, “make chilling reading in 
the light of the known history of Caleb, Patrick, Sarah and Laura”: R v Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 23, 
per Sully J, [132]. 
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quality—precludes the possibility of a more complex inner life for Folbigg.45  And it 
is worth noting here that, as so meticulously documented by Emma, this flattening of 
ambiguity is a strategy that is used in relation to the expert evidence as well—the 
removal of qualification and the eliciting of a hardening of incriminating opinion that 
is done so skillfully, but also seems to happen almost inevitably, that perhaps even 
Tedeschi might be surprised by what he has wrought. 
 
The Crown narrative of the overbearing monstrous mother, and use of her diaries to 
reveal her true nature also, and Emma I think alludes to this, taps into the idea that 
Folbigg epitomises the deceptive, violent, murderous woman who has had us all 
fooled. In Lane’s case, the Crown narrative also emphasised the ‘golden girl’ with the 
secret life and hidden tendencies—the ongoing and deep deception that was both 
evidenced, and revealed, by the multiple (concealed) pregnancies. The point here is 
complicated, not so much a counter narrative as the supplement to the narrative that 
sees, or purports to see, murder by a mother of her child as inexplicable, and thus 
must be in some way pathological.
46
 Rather it is a construction in which deception is 
inevitably constituted in the (violent, immature, natural) female offender and, because 
of the discursive constructions of gendered difference that are at work here, more 
fundamentally of Women.
47
  
 
This construction of feminised deviance, and female criminality, and perhaps in 
particular the construction of the woman who has murdered her child, is never a 
simple story of departure or aberration from the norm(ative).  In fact, as Smart has 
noted, there is, in the construction of the female criminal, a double strategy at work, 
one that is premised on the capacity to characterise Woman, and thus the female 
offender, as “both kind and killing, active and aggressive, virtuous and evil, charitable 
and abominable, not either virtuous or evil.”48 And in this respect it is perhaps worth 
noting a further layer, another echo chamber, one that is hinted at in Emma’s account, 
generated by the cross currents within feminist analysis concerned with agency, 
                                                        
45
 It is worth noting here also the presentation of Folbigg as a woman of limited intelligence and 
stunted emotional development, which particularly came to the fore in her sentencing. Emma’s account 
of the ways in which the diaries could be read draws on a far more nuanced account of women’s 
writing. And in this regard it might be worth considering by way of comparison (and contrast) the 
conventional image of the female novelist, writing in secret, revealing her hidden depth of 
understanding only her novels. In other work, Emma usefully extends this analytical approach to the 
reading of other forms of court documents: “(This Is Not a) Story: Using Court Records to Explore 
Judicial Narratives in R v Kathleen Folbigg” (2007) 27 Australian Feminist Law Journal 71. 
46
 See, for example, discussion in Raitt and Zeedyk, above n 40. Raitt and Zeedyk open their article 
with the comment of Justice Hallet, trial judge in R v Cannings [2004] 1 EWCA Crim 1: “I have no 
doubt that for a woman like you to have committed the terrible acts of suffocating on your own babies 
there must have been something seriously wrong with you. …” (emphasis added). 
47
 See Carol Smart, “The Woman of Legal Discourse” in Law Crime and Sexuality (Sage Publications, 
1995).  
48
 Smart, above n 47, 194. Smart’s point is that these seemingly contradictory constructions become 
explicable once we realise that they are implicated in the construction of gendered difference more 
broadly. 
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women and violence, but circulating in the public sphere in a form that, inevitably, 
flattens out historical complexity.  For we should also consider how these narratives 
and (re)constructions of normative motherhood and of concealed criminality play out 
in a ‘post-feminist’ era and how the figure of the self-absorbed “baby killer mum” can 
both reveal and replicate a narrative that was a distinctive strand in what we used to 
call the ‘backlash’—and  remains a persistent and pervasive element of contemporary 
gendered discourse—the ‘popular theory’ of the expressive, violent girl/woman as the 
inevitable supplement to feminism and equality.
49
  
 
So as Emma points out through her opening epigraph, it is complicated, though 
Emma’s account makes it at least easier to understand the ways in which the medical, 
legal and popular discourses converged, with such devastating effect, in Folbigg’s 
case. And to understand why the narrative cannot be that of the rogue Prosecutor, nor 
is it one of deliberate inattention, or malice, on the part of the court, the experts 
(though I suspect that Emma is willing to go harder here) or defence counsel. While it 
is important, as Murder, Medicine and Motherhood does, to focus attention on the 
conduct of the prosecution, and while it is perhaps easy to do as I have done, and 
make connections with the other cases run by Tedeschi, it is also important to remind 
ourselves that the obligations of the Prosecutor are but one of the failed trial 
safeguards—and that (all of) these cases are, indeed telling, diagnostic of systemic 
failure in the operation of the conventional adversarial trial, and that accusatorial 
principles require a rethink of the way that courts have conventionally approached the 
admission and evaluation of expert opinion.
50
 But in the broader sense, that these 
cases are ‘telling’ instances, popular trials, or moments of hyperpublicity, cases like 
Folbigg and Lane, and, notwithstanding the distinction that I drew earlier, also Wood 
and Gilham, are, by Fitzpatrick’s definition, a symptom of an obsession, that a trial 
process, conventional or otherwise, is going to be unable to resolve, at the very point 
when the situation demands, of the process, resolution. So in this environment, how to 
offer a way forward, while at the same time insisting, as Emma does, on the analytical 
importance of uncertainty? 
 
Recent coverage of the Folbigg case in Australia has focused on the flaws in the 
expert evidence that was presented at Folbigg’s trial, drawing attention to 
contemporary understandings of multiple infant death, and including speculation that 
                                                        
49
 Meaghan Morris uses the term ‘popular theory’ to describe the, often hegemonic, ideas that circulate 
in and as popular culture: see Mehera San Roque, “Popular Trials/ Criminal Fictions/ Celebrity 
Feminism and the Bernardo/Homolka Case” (1999) 13 Australian Feminist Law Journal 38. See also 
Carol Smart, “Feminist Approaches to Criminology, or Postmodern Woman meets Atavistic Man” in 
Law, Crime and Sexuality, above n 47; Alison Young, “Criminology and the Question of Feminism” in 
Imagining Crime (Sage Publications, 1996); and discussion in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 
101-103. 
50
 In this respect it is disappointing that in Wood, the Court of Criminal Appeal draws attention to the 
obligations of prosecutions, but does not really get beyond the rogue prosecutor explanation. 
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were Folbigg to be tried today, the medical evidence could not support a conviction.
51
 
One of the strengths of Murder, Medicine and Motherhood is the careful account of 
the development and state of the medical literature underpinning the prosecution of 
Folbigg. The analysis is revealing in a number of ways, demonstrating both the 
deficiencies of the evidence itself, but perhaps more significantly documenting the 
way in which the trial process itself contributed to the production of what was 
arguably a distorted picture of agreement within the field, overstated the strength of 
the evidence, and further encouraged the prosecution experts to ‘harden’ their 
opinion. The argument is that not only was Folbigg prosecuted at a moment where the 
accepted scientific account was itself shifting, but also that her trial occurred at a 
moment when the punitive narratives of normative motherhood attached to the 
account of multiple infant death were operating at their full strength. But while it may 
be true to say that a more tempered view of the expert evidence might mean that a 
prosecution today, against Folbigg, might not succeed, as I think Lane’s case shows, 
the normative values that underpinned Tedeschi’s narrative have proved to be 
extraordinarily persistent—we are not all ‘postfeminists’ now, and it is important not 
to become complacent about changing times.  
 
But as I have said before, Emma’s book is special because in Murder, Medicine and 
Motherhood she combines her clear eyed gendered analysis with an account of how 
the case is significant in terms of the operation of the adversarial system and she 
manages to provide concrete (even simple, though not simplistic) principles that can 
be used both to manage conflicting expert evidence but also to elicit better 
information so as to enable a trial court to better assess both the strengths and risks 
attendant on such evidence. Emma argues that when dealing with infant deaths, single 
or multiple, we need to be attentive, at first instance to our starting point; that is to say 
that interpretations of behaviour, demeanour, and indeed written records such as 
diaries, must proceed from, and thus be moderated by, the presumption of innocence. 
As was made clear in Canning, much will depend on your starting point.
52
  
 
Next, confirming the point made in Canning, and applied in Matthey, when 
considering expert (medical) opinion as to cause of death, it is critical to guard against 
double counting.
53
 Most obviously expert opinion cannot rely on the now discredited 
assumptions that the rarity of the multiple deaths is itself indicative of cause. But 
                                                        
51
 See, for example, Eamonn Duff, “New Science would let Folbigg go free”, The Sun-Herald 
(Sydney) 3 February 2013, 4; Mark Whittaker, “Did she do it?”, Good Weekend (Sydney), 2 February 
2013, 18-20. 
52
 See discussion in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 205. Note, again by way of contrast to 
Folbigg, that in Matthey, Justice Coldrey takes a far more nuanced approach to the interpretation of 
cues such as demeanour, including (lack of) expressions of grief, as well as noting that evidence of 
observations as to the accused’s relationship with her children are likewise of minimal probative value 
as evidence of the accused’s ‘true’ state of mind: see R v Matthey [2007] VSC 389, [283], [290], [292]-
[299]. 
53
 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 71. 
San Roque Book Discussion: Murder, Medicine and Motherhood 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20 
 
equally, if expert opinion in this area will be shaped, almost inevitably, by 
interpretations of psycho-social factors, then this needs to be clearly articulated and 
understood within the trial context. Consequent on this is thus an obligation on courts, 
on judges, when considering the admissibility of incriminating expert evidence, to 
sharpen up their analysis, and to be far more attentive, in a substantive way, to the 
basis of the expert opinion.
54
 In this context this is particularly important where the 
reasoning process may have involved the expert being exposed to (arguably) domain 
irrelevant information or double counting.
55
  
 
Equally, expert obligations in terms of disclosure of reasoning need to be addressed, 
by the expert, in substantive rather than formulistic terms and Emma’s principles 
would require the expert to not only describe the investigations that were undertaken, 
and the reasoning process involved, but also to situate the analysis within the existing 
literature, and to be explicit about the conditions of uncertainty and doubt affecting 
the field. Significantly, and in line with cases such as Canning (and Matthey), Emma 
points out that some conditions of uncertainty will mandate an acquittal.
56
 And thus 
running parallel to this is an obligation on judges, lawyers, and in particular 
prosecutors, to be far more attentive to the significance of uncertainty within a 
discipline; conventional adversarial safeguards or reforms of procedure, with their 
focus on form over substance, are not a sufficient proxy. So not only must we be 
sceptical of the manner in which the asserted compliance with Expert Codes is taken 
at face value by (trial) courts, but we must also ensure that the prosecutorial 
obligation to disclose uncertainty to the defence is a real one.
57
 Finally, courts need to 
be attentive to shifts in opinion, and to be particularly cautious where it becomes 
                                                        
54
 In the civil sphere, but consistent with emerging trends in criminal cases, in cases such as Dasreef 
Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21, courts in Australia have recently (re)directed attention to the 
importance of determining the ‘basis’ of the expert opinion (see also HG v The Queen [1999] HCA 2), 
but have stopped short of imposing a condition of substantive or demonstrative reliability on 
incriminating evidence proffered by the state. See, for example, discussion in Edmond and San Roque, 
above n 10; Gary Edmond, “Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response to Expert 
Evidence Law and Procedure in Australia” (2010) 42 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 83-99; 
and Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque, “Just(,) Quick and Cheap: Do We Need More Reliable 
Expert Evidence in Civil Proceedings?” in Michael Legg (ed), The Future of Dispute Resolution 
(LexisNexis, 2013). The recent decision in Dupas v R [2012] VSCA 328 does, however, offer the 
possibility of a Victorian-led shift in the jurisprudence in this area. Emma discusses trends in this area 
more broadly in “Independence, Reliability and Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials” (2013) 45 
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 284. 
55
 A far sharper, contextually sensitive, analysis of the ways in which the tendency and coincidence 
rules function in this area is also indicated. 
56
 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, 201. 
57
 Gilham and Wood offer salutary lessons here. In a different, but equally fraught field, see for 
example the discussion and strong criticism of the conduct of the Commonwealth DPP for its reliance 
on discredited techniques and inadequately qualified experts in its prosecution of minors for people 
smuggling offences. The report of the inquiry into these cases drew attention to the fact that the 
Commonwealth DPP continued to rely on a discredited technique for many years after it was on notice 
that the evidence they were relying on did not have a proper foundation, and further that there was a 
failure to disclose the known limitations to the defence: An Age of Uncertainty, above n 10, Chapter 3, 
especially 138 ff.  
feminists@law Vol 3, No 2 (2013) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21 
 
apparent that an expert has hardened their opinion as the investigation and trial 
unfolds.  More specifically in relation to infant deaths, Emma proposes a set of 
categories that will help prosecutors, experts and courts to manage the complexity, 
and help them to identify which cases are most likely to be vulnerable to 
mistranslation, to double counting, to miscarriage.
58
  
 
Emma’s proposed principles are ones that have been developed in response to the 
particular risks revealed in the Folbigg prosecution, and in this respect her book is 
located firmly as part of a feminist reform project. This location is particularly clear 
when we consider the principles she offers as ways to think about Fobigg’s diaries 
that are attentive to the complexities of relying on such documents.
59
 But further, it is 
this careful attention to the narrative patterns that reflected and instantiated normative 
ideologies of motherhood in this ‘telling’ case that enable what might be otherwise 
seem as a distinct (ungendered) reform project with respect to the management and 
evaluation of expert evidence more broadly.
 60
 Her proscriptions and prescriptions are 
informed by her attentiveness to and acceptance of the inevitable role of 
interpretation, mediation and (re)construction when dealing with expertise in the 
courtroom—and that this process might be able to support the production of more, 
rather than less, reliable evidence.
61
  
 
And these principles that Emma foreshadows in the final chapter of Murder, Medicine 
and Motherhood, and develops further elsewhere, are principles that can be applied 
by courts now.
62
 They are consistent with fundamental principles of the criminal 
trial—ensuring fairness for the defendant, the presumption of innocence, proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, factual rectitude—and with current evidentiary rules and 
frameworks,
63
 introducing new safeguards into the trial directed towards managing a 
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 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, Chapter 4 and 200. 
59
 Again, while these ideas might be most easily related to cases with comparable fact patterns, they are 
by no means limited to such cases. 
60
 Comparison with work such as Dorothy E Smith’s The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist 
Sociology of Knowledge (University of Toronto Press, 1990), or Rosemary Hennessy’s (above n 36), 
comes to mind here.  
61
 In this regard, Latour insists on what is perhaps a reconfigured image of certainty when he argues 
that reliability and accuracy should be seen as the products of mediation and interpretation: see Bruno 
Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Duke University Press, 2010). 
62
 See also Emma Cunliffe, “Independence, Reliability and Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials”, 
above n 54. 
63
 This is notwithstanding the fact that the development of a jurisprudence around the admissibility of 
expert evidence in Uniform Evidence Law jurisdictions, particularly with respect to incriminating 
expert evidence, has been slow and uneven, and that courts, particularly in New South Wales, have 
resisted importing a condition of reliability as a threshold requirement. Even in Uniform Evidence Law 
jurisdictions there are signs of a (limited) shift in approach in relation to expert evidence, and a recent 
authoritative decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal has confirmed that the trial judge does have a 
role in evaluating the reliability of evidence when considering whether to exclude evidence that might 
be prejudicial, confusing or misleading, to the extent that the risks outweigh the probative value of the 
evidence (s 137 Uniform Evidence Law): Dupas v R, above n 54. Note, however, the NSWCCA’s 
responsive counterpoint to Dupas, on the interpretation of s 137, in R v XY [2013] NSWCCA 121, 
handed down in May 2013. In relation to relationships between fundamental fair trial principles and 
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potentially pathological coproduction.
64
 Her principles are very much in line with 
reforms that might be developed in response to critiques of forensic sciences informed 
by the critique, for example, of the National Academy of Sciences,
65
 but they offer 
something that can be done without a need to wait for a broad, externally generated 
reform project, or a wholesale revision of the trial process, or the manner and form in 
which expert evidence is presented to such a forum.  
 
In Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (and elsewhere) Emma actively resists and 
reconstructs the conventional law/science binaries, and consequently she offers 
something both more realisable and more nuanced than the conventional ‘reform’ 
agendas of concurrent evidence, expert codes, specialised courts, judge only trials, 
and other standard responses to the expert evidence ‘crisis’ as it is conventionally 
configured. Such responses, may offer some benefits, and—putting aside the 
perennial calls for the abolition of the jury—they are not necessarily inconsistent with 
Emma’s principles. But, as conventionally configured, such responses generally over-
estimate the efficacy of procedural reform and they lack reflexivity; they fail to 
account for the complexity of the dynamics that Murder, Medicine and Motherhood 
uncovers. Thus to insist on uncertainty, as Emma does in her conclusion, is a 
principled response, but more than this, it is also a pragmatic one.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
admissibility rules for expert evidence, see, for example, Gary Edmond and Andrew Roberts, 
“Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and Medicine” (2011) 33 Sydney Law 
Review 359. 
64
 The characterisation of coproduction as potentially pathological is borrowed from Gary Edmond and 
discussed in Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque (with others), “Justicia’s Gaze: Surveillance, 
Evidence and the Criminal Trial” (on file). 
65
 See above n 4. 
